Differentia: Review of Italian Thought
Number 3 Combined Issue 3-4 Spring/Autumn

Article 4

1989

“Idola” of the Postmodern: Untopical Considerations on the End
(and the Principle) of History
Giacomo Marramao

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.library.stonybrook.edu/differentia

Recommended Citation
Marramao, Giacomo (1989) "“Idola” of the Postmodern: Untopical Considerations on the End (and the
Principle) of History," Differentia: Review of Italian Thought: Vol. 3 , Article 4.
Available at: https://commons.library.stonybrook.edu/differentia/vol3/iss1/4

This document is brought to you for free and open access by Academic Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Differentia: Review of Italian Thought by an authorized editor of Academic Commons. For more
information, please contact mona.ramonetti@stonybrook.edu, hu.wang.2@stonybrook.edu.

"ldola" of the Postmodern
Untopical Considerations on the End
(and the Principle) of History
Giacomo Marramao

1. SECULARIZATION

AS "LOPSIDED" PLAN:
THE LIMITS OF LOWITH'S INTERPRETATION

From the late medieval period on there emerges-in concomitance with the work of the glossators 1-a particular way of conceiving
of political change. This consists of a resumption and a readaptation of the old cyclic schema of Polybius and is mediated by a
true rediscovery of Aristotle's Politics. The aristotelian text-"canonical text of this story," according to Bobbio's definition 2-is
the great absence from the "de civitate" disputes of the christian
literature of the first centuries: it is, in fact, rediscovered only at
the end of the thirteenth century (while for the rediscovery of
Cicero's De Republicawe have to wait until the beginning of the
fourteenth century no less). The effect of the "rediscovery" is, as
often happens in cases of this kind, absolutely diremptive: the
celebrated classification of the forms of government (which distinguishes, as is well known, three good forms-monarchy,
aristocracy and politeia-and three bad ones-tyrannies,
oligarchies and
democracy) is not only taken up again and made the object of
renewed reflection, but is reproduced and applied to a reality
which is rather different from that of the declining polis which
constituted the historical-sociological referent of Greek philOriginally published in Filosofia '87, Ed. by G. Vattimo (Bari: Laterza,
1988).

[Translatedfrom the Italian by Paul J. Thibault]
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osophy. It should suffice to recall that Marsilio of Padua himself,
in the eighth chapter of a major work like the Defensorpacis(1324),
does nothing more than reinstate "a repetition pure and simple" 3
of the aristotelian schema . On the other hand, the case of
Machiavelli (which we cannot, for obvious reasons, engage at
length on this occasion) would merit a separate discussion. Prima
facie, the machiavellian oeuvre seems to be constituted in perfect
continuity with the reinstatement of the classical model of politics.
This impression is, however, deceptive for two sets of reasons.
In the first place, the florentine secretary did not refer directly to
the Politicsof Aristotle, but to the sixth book of Polybius' Histories,
in which the classification is inserted into a cyclic movement of
the "anakyklesis ," in such a way as to interpenetrate with a "cyclic
theory" of platonic ancestry. 4 In the second place, the alternation
of the good forms with the "defective" and "corrupt" ones no
longer occurs through the stimulus of an inexorable natural necessity, which is independent of the will and the subjective choices
(the polybian physeos ananke), but occurs "randomly between
men," 5 that is to say: as the contingent result of their actions.
Thanks to this powerful inflection of the classical apparatus, the
"reappearance of Polybius in western culture" (according to an
expression of our great scholar of antiquity, the late Arnaldo
Momigliano 6 ) comes to coincide with the affirmation of that artificiality of the state-political order, which represents, starting with
Machiavelli, the political model for modernity itself.
Yet beyond these preliminary historical exactitudes, there
lurks a theoretical problem, which we now intend to focus on. It
has its roots in the concomitancewhich was mentioned at the beginning. What does this concomitance involve? A decisive fact not
only on the genetic level, but also on the more narrowly" doctrinal"
one: the contemporaneity of the birth of the (modern) concept of
revolutionand of the (modern) concept of sovereignty.Parallel with
the reinstatement on the part of the glossators of the famous
fragment of Ulpiano around the "summa legibusque soluta polestas" and the formula "rex superiorem non recognoscens in regno
suo est imperator" (along a not always continuous trajectory,
which reaches its crowning point with hobbesian theory 7) light is
shed upon, in the body of the european politico-juridical doctrines,
a schema for change which has more or less this form : oppression,
liberation, social contract, political struggle, new society. This process gradually assumes the outlines of that which we moderns
have called, for these past two centuries, revolutionary process.
And, even if the term revolution(which consists of the transposition
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of the greek term apokatastasis),in its present-day meaning of
political overthrow, has a relatively recent usage, there is no doubt
that since the renaissance period its pragmatic usage already tends
to pierce the shield of the astronomical and astrological metaphor.
Although with Machiavelli one still spoke of the "circle" around
which the republics "turn," it is not difficult to realize that, in
reality, that circle does not close and that its movement has, by
this time, taken a direction forward which already seems to allude
in more respects than one to the cumulative idea of Process to
which we are accustomed.
The story implicit in the schema just reported is not, however,
equally told everywhere. It is not a universal schema common to
all civilizations, but regards specifically the Occident as the heir
of an idea of linear, irreversible and progressively "liberatory"
time, whose origin goes back to the very eschatological conception
of judaism and christianity. The idea of the judaeo-christian conception of the "redemption" as the explanatory key of the absolutely unique cultural event of the Occident (and of the hegemonic
destiny of this "uniqueness," whose power of rationalization, capable of imposing itself on all other cultures, is literally incomprehensible, if it is distinguished from that originary interior
energy), goes back, as is well known, to Max Weber. 8 In his wake,
it has nevertheless found a rather ample and articulated treatment
in the work of Karl Lowith. 9 The specific contribution of this
important German scholar consists-above and beyond his overall
hermeneutic schema as a key to the "secularization" and to the
radical criticism of every philosophy of history-in having pointed
out the sources of the modern idea of progress (cultivated in its
most markedly "lay" and illuministic physiognomy: that of the
seventeenth and nineteenth centuries in the rebirth of the millenary thought of the late medieval and protomodern periods). We
have here a starting point which surpasses by far the ambit of
historiographical reconstruction in order to lodge itself in the heart
of theoretic philosophy stricto sensu, namely, the idea for which,
if the specific aspect of occidental Kultur lies in an intuition of
time as the mere availability for consumption of itself and in the
consequent valorization of the irreversibilityaspect insofar as it is
the expression-precisely-of
a time-in-consumption (of a "dying
time," of a time which is, and exclusively, for-its-death), it follows
that not only the concept of revolution, but also that of progress,
would descend from the "hope of redemption" and would be
nothing more than secular "millenarianism" and secularized "messianism." 10
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Lowith' s interpretative schema will never be sufficiently valorized in our culture, owing to the way in which it succeeds in
destabilizing some of the most consolidated and widespread topoi
of the historical mentality. In spite of this, it is afflicted with a
rather serious limitation, which consists, in the first place, in emphasizing all but unilaterally the genealogy to the detriment of
the conceptualstratigraphy,that is to say, of the analysis of determinate historical-conceptual metamorphoses and changes. In the
Lowithian schema, the following question remains completely
unanswered: Through what translations of sense has the temporality of the old "theologies of history" (from Augustine and Orosio
to Bossuet) been able to enrich the "philosophie de l'histoire" of
illuministic stamp? But, beyond this general methodological limit,
a more determinate limit is to be reckoned with in the schema
which brings the modern ideas of progressand of revolution back
to the political messianism of Joachim da Fiore or to the seven
protestants of puritan stamp, there is ratified and coercively united
a line which tends to "remove," or to relegate to the rank of
negligible "intervals," the periodic rebirthsof cyclicmodels(the most
visible case is that of the renaissance, but other eloquent periodsfrom the seventeenth century, from the eighteenth century, and
from the nineteenth century itself, commonly defined as "century
of progress"-could
be adduced).
This Verdriingunginvolves rather weighty consequences: on
both the historiographical level, as well as on the more exclusively
theoretical one . In the first place, the Lowithian inability to discern
the persistence of the thread line and circle: the true "Gordian
knot," which runs across the entire event of the Zeitauffassung,of
the occidental "concertion of time," in which is included the
judaeo-christian one. 1 And, in the second instance, the assembling under a single matrix of categories subtended to phenomena
and doctrinal complexes which are rather heterogeneous among
themselves: messianism, eschatological vision, and apocalyptic
vision are-in this sense-anything
but synonymous. But in order
to find their differential features, it is necessary to call into question
another idea, to which the idea of revolution appears closely related: the idea of Exodus-. The schema of the exodus, the great
religious archetype of "linear temporality" (to undertake an
exodus, it is necessary to go out from a point x towards a point
y: it is necessary, in other words, to go towards ... ), does it not
perhaps also reconnect the image of a "promised land" (ou-topic
image which hints at an ou-chronic movement) to the idea of a
restoration of a status quo ante? Of revolution, in the literal-
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etymological sense of restoration?Therefore: of "cycle"? Will not
the Revolution then always necessarily be conceived as a revolution
accordingto the Law?
2. AT THE ORIGINS OF HISTORY: THE EXODUS AS THE
NARRATIVE PROTOTYPE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS

The Book of Exodus has for centuries constitued the hermeneutic model of the revolutionary process of liberation. Reflection on it is then an unavoidable step for getting to the bottom
of the variegated conceptual constructs which are at the foundations of the western theory of "revolution" in its dual variant:
"absolute" revolution (understood as the secular transposition of
the eschatological hope and, for this reason, as Event of universal
value) and revolution as "relative-historical" fact (understood as
a specific spatio-temporal response to specific problems). In this
sense, the investigation of the Exodus theme appears indispensable for unravelling the Gordian knot constituted by the indiscriminate assemblage of terms such as "messianism," "eschatology"
and "apocalypse."
The Exodus is, above all, a narrative structure: a tale. It is,
as the american philosopher Michael Walzer 12 observes, "the story
of release and liberation expressed in religious terms." But it "is
also an historical tale, secular and earthly." In other words, it is
not a question of a supernatural tale-although
the miracle is a
part of it-but of a realistic tale. And, as in every self-respecting
story, there is a beforeand an irrevocable after. That is: irreducible
to any desire for reversibility, any "magic circle" of mythology.
As "movement in the literal sense," as "advancement in space
and time," Exodus represents then "the originary form (or formula) of the progressive story."
Up to this point, the interpretation submitted by Walzer (put
forward on the basis of direct and accurate analysis of Exodus,
Numbers and Deuteronomy and an indirect hermeneutic, that is,
conducted on English translations of the texts of the medieval
Jewish commentators: from Midrash Rabbah to Mekilta De-Rabbi
Ishmael, from the notes of Rashi to the commentaries of
Nachmanides 13 ) would appear to follow exactly the example of
Lowith, almost as if it were meant to corroborate its genealogy
through the detailed examination of the principal old testament
topoi. Accordingly, the narrative machinery of the Book of Exodus
would have penetrated into "our political culture" on account of
the "centrality of the Bible in western thought and its continual
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re-reading." That is the reason why, concludes Walzer, "the thinking of Exodus seems to have survived to the secularization of
political theory." Not only the definition, but also the conclusion
of this reasoning would appear, therefore, to confirm the Lowithian interpretation, for which the secularizing dynamic, far from
constituting a process of dissolution "without residue" of the
theologemes, would limit itself to dislocating its center of gravity,
in the sense of a growing sacralizationof the events of the "profane"
world.
Yet the parallel visions induced by these general propositions
are misleading and deceptive. Very different, if not quite opposite,
is the objective of the author. He aims, in fact, to demonstrate
that the assumption of Exodus inside a cosmic vision distinguished
by the circular movement which goes from the creation (and successive fall) to the final redemption is produced because of an
unwarranted transposition of that narrative schema into an eschatological and apocalyptical key: linear time, introduced into an
historical (and not cosmological) abode by the Book of Exodus,
would thus come to be assimilated to the late jewish and protochristian eschatologies of a gnostic character and to the "apocalyptic
doctrines of Daniel and of the Apocalypse."
A further semantic slippage of the narrative of Exodus would
be brought about, according to the American scholar, as a consequence of the superimposing of the messianicconception.Except
that we must recall something which the "genealogists" a la Lowith
have barely considered, namely, that messianism enters late in
jewish history. Although messianism does appear-as
Saad ya
Gaon, jewish philosopher of the ninth century, was to note 14through the thinking of Exodus, where, for instance, the final
redemption is nothing more than the originary redemption (it,
too, preceded, in the Hebrew versions, by a new Exodus, by the
reappearance of Moses, etc.), there's an additional and more significant circumstance which refers to the exclusively doctrinal
level. In fact, though characterized by the introduction of the idea
of the "end of the days" and by the promise of "new heavens
and new earth," messianism is differentiated form the eschatological and apocalyptical visions by its refusal of all waiting and for
its readiness to "force the End." Which does not mean, Walzer
comments, "to act only politically (instead of waiting for the omnipotent intervention of God), but to act politically for the final
goal." Notwithstanding this distinction, Walzer seems to sympathize with the clean break operated by Gershom Scholem between political zionism and messianic judaism:
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I deny absolutely that zionism is a messianic movement [ ... ]
the redemption of the jewish people, which I wish for as a
Zionist, is in no way identical with the religious redemption that
I hope for in the future [ ... ]. The zionist ideal is one thing
and the messianic ideal another and the two do not meet unless
in the pompous phraseology of mass parades. 15

If Scholem, however, limited himself to affirming the unsuturable
dieresis between the level of the "promise" of redemption and
the level of political utopia (of any political utopia), Walzer hastens
to bring back without hesitation the great metaphor of Exodus to
the second of the two levels in question: and it is exactly such a
reductio which enables him, as we shall soon see, to operate a
moderate disenchantment (as an "ameliorist") with the idea of
"revolution." What counts above all else for him is to confirm the
radical heterogeneity between the biblical Exodus and the ancient
legends of journeys which-no matter how they turn out-begin
and end "at home": from the journey of Odysseus to Ithaca and
the journey to Byblos in Phoenicia of the egyptian priest of the
eleventh century, Wen-Amon. For the living israelites, the promised land is a "new land" where there is no one to welcome them.
The Book of Exodus-the
american scholar therefore concludes-realizes
in the meantime a decisive break with every cosmological narrative (myth of the Eternal Return) in that it puts
into effect an historical narrative. Beneath this profile, it also represents the quintessence of biblical narration in its entirety, where
"historical events occur once and draw [their] full significance
from a system of interconnections between past and present, and
not from the hierarchic correspondences of myth." It is the historic
"virtuosity" of the narrative schema of Exodus-facing the circular
"viciousness" of the Eternal Return-which
makes possible its
transposition into a sort of politological model of change: Egyptdesert-promised land-that is, the three narrative stages of Exodus
(beginning-middle-end)-can
thus be easily translated into the
triad problem-struggle-solution.
To the point of inducing it to
speak of a "politics of Exodus" with an amphibious profile: "moderate and prudent," if compared to political messianism; "revolutionary," if compared to the passivity and resignation of the
traditional ideologies.
Neat scheme, that of Walzer. And what is more, impeccably
executed. However, a problem remains, mentioned by the author
himself and never taken up again (et pour cause: given that its
treatment would have obscured the "ameliorist" wisdom of his
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reading of Exodus): the power of Exodus is not so much in the
beginning of the story, as in its conclusion:the divine promise. But
the Promise is also the prime agent, the engine of the exodus
itself. For this reason, principle and end are all one: they are
reconnected in a circular motion whose center is not topological
or geographical , but ethical. Principle and end reside-equal before the Law-not in a hyperuranian and remote transcendence,
but in the dimension close to us of interiority: "within your mouth
and within your heart," as it is said in Deuteronomy (30: 11-14).
Egypt is not only left behind. It is refused. That is: judged and
condemned. And the fundamental terms of this judgment are:
oppression and corruption. But what is it that makes the judgment
possible, if not the Promise? The moral force of that judgment
would be nothing without the idea of a life which is no longer
oppressive and corrupt: from which oppression and corruption
are definitively eradicated.
Does not then another story begin here, this one indeed truly
discontinuous with respect to the classical mythologemes of the
Eternal Return? A story in which Geschehen(mere "happening"),
invested with "sense" in its totality and the meaning of "value"
deep within its most negligible particulars, becomes Geschichte?
A story in which the interweaving of "line" and "circle" is reproposed on the assumption of the ethical judgment and the demand
for commutation and redemption?
The terms of the question thus recast, the operation-which
culminates in the figure of the Entzauberung or of the Entmythologisierung (of the secular "disenchantment"
or of the
theological "demythologization")-will
necessarily assume more
dramatic and, literally, more radical profiles. 16 It will happen, that
is, not indeed in terms of a banal line of demarcation with respect
to eschatological and apocalyptical perspectives, but (on the contrary) by starting from a disputed abrogation, which involves, at
its foundations, the "futurism" implicit in the modern concepts
of History, Progress and Revolution. Secular theorists of society
and politics such as Max Weber and christian theologians such as
Barth, Bultmann and Gogarten have only produced, in this sense,
courageous and powerful records of a process which has already
occurred in "things themselves," which is already "consumed"
by the same dynamic of "modern secularization." The radicality
and the seriousness with which these authors take note of the
already occurred "disenchantment with the world" is, when all
is said and done, in the lucid awareness that the counteraims (the
so-called perverse effects of Progress) are not at all in presumed
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"exogenous" factors (in obstacles or unforeseen variables that the
modern project was not able to envisage opportunely), but rather
sink their own roots in the same "monotheistic" structure of
Historical Time from which "high profile" categories such as Revolution or Liberation-as much as "low profile" categories like
increment, growth, improvement, etc.--draw so much nourishment. The failure, which involves the entire complex of these
categories, formed in the great cultural climate of the european
enlightenment, has been visible for some time now in the proliferating of the oxymorons most characteristic of the political lexicon of the twentieth century, expressions such as "right-wing
revolution" or "conservative revolution." And it is in this same
span of years that terms such as progress and evolution end up
losing the positive axiological thurst they had at the beginning,
giving way to neutral categories such as modernizationand development. Is it not perhaps by virtue of this neutralization that the
same Revolutionsbegriffcomes to lose its own disruptive and liberatory features, in order to be transformed into a factor of modernization, susceptible to becoming an object of cold quantitative and
comparative analyses?
If all of this represents, without a shadow of doubt, the historical-sociological outcome of the "disenchantment," it is, however, necessary to add that this outcome does not at all exhaust
its importance and implications on the ethico-philosophical level.
From the Entzauberung, understood as the conclusion of modernity, and from the Entmythologisierung,understood as the landingplace for secularized monotheism, a new culture climate is in fact
released, and whose implications are investigated by neither the
new postmodern apologetic of the "death of God" nor the various
deconstructionist or hermeneutic approaches to the thematics of
the Subject and of the Foundation: the polytheisticcultural order.
3. "POLYTHEISM" AND CONFLICT OF VALUES : FROM THE
"PRINZIP HOFFNUNG" TO THE "PRINZIP VERANTWORTUNG"

Starting with the nietzschean announcement of the "death of
God," our epoch has been insistently connoted as the era of
polytheism. Diagnostic schemes prepared by very different disciplinary perspectives and ideals-from philosophy to theology,
from history to anthropology-have
converged on the definition
of the Occident as "exploded cultural sphere."
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Polytheism remains, however, an equivocal term. On account
of a sort of energetic thrust endogenous to the world itself, it
seems to allude to a polymorphous signification, leaving undecided whether it is a question of a return of the old gods or of
the advent of "new gods" in a sort of neopagan cultural climate
from vanished "ideolo~cal" confines: not by chance the theme of
the "new polytheism" 1 continues even today to represent one of
the battle cries of the "new right," as of the "new left." This aspect
of the matter, however, seems to us secondary with respect to a
hermeneutic implication more profound than that which the expression polytheism implies: the disenchantment inaugurated by
the" death of God" doesnot involve a world which is de-ideologized
and de-sacralized tout court. The disenchantment involves, instead, that return of the "ancient gods" who "aspire to dominate
our life and therefore to resume their eternal contest," which an
author as sober and restrained as Max Weber explicitly mentions
in his famous conference Scienceas Profession(held in 1918-exactly
in the culminating year of the geistige Entscheidungen-at Munich
in Bavaria before a group of students returned from the war). 18
The weberian definition of secularization can, obviously, be
accepted or even rejected in toto. If, however, it is assumed as the
point of departure, it is necessary to resist the temptation to carry
out convenient reductions of it and to be prepared to accept all
its complexity as well as the "gravity" of its consequences. It is
well-known that Weber intends the return of the "ancient" gods
as the virile ascent of a plurality-tragically
undecidable on the
philosophical, or theoretical plane strictu sensu-of "centers of
value." It follows, therefore, that that "return" does not at all
constitute a faithful repetition of the old and that, as a consequence, we can speak of the "antiquity" of those gods only by way
of pallid analogy. That which is meant then by the term polytheism
is, in reality, nothing more than the non-mechanical derivative
(once one would have said dialectic)of the monotheistic cultural
climates which mark the advent of "occidental rationalism" in its
phase of maximum disclosure. The problem of the modern-a
term today so abused as to have almost lost all semantic effectiveness-resides
for Weber almost entirely in this "ambivalence": in
the unforeseen (and yet endogenously predestined) "dialectical"
counteraltar of its outcomes. If, however, a certain dialectic could
be adumbrated-in
the way in which Weber, at the conclusion of
the Protestant Ethic, represents the overturning of that which, at
its beginnings, had the appearance of a "fine veil" in the oppres-
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sive "steel cage" of the administered world 19-it is well to be clear
that the dialectic is entirely sui generis:it lacks, in fact, the characterizing moment of the Aufhebung, of the repealing-becoming true
of the "negative"; so the outcome of the process comes to coincide
with a bare crystallizationeffect of "linear temporality" rather than
with an act of resolution. Looked on with hindsight, from the perspective of its result, the advent of the plurisecular process of
rationalization and "making worldly" of the regulating principles
of science and politics, which make up the cultural patrimony of
the modern Occident, is represented as an unheard of dissemination of the decisionistic energies (of the Miichteor "powers") contained in the "centers of value." Read in a bad light, and availing
oneself of adequate hermeneutic lenses, the great weberian
schema seems to communicate to us that the occidental project
of technico-scientific neutralization of the originary "powers" has
ended up giving space to a critical mass of counteraims, which
appear less and less governable within the networks-increasingly
more sophisticated, but also more and more exasperatingly self-referential-of the formal rationality of "enlightenment" stamp. And
once again, looked at from the point of view of its conclusion,
the act of progressive erosionof the onto-theological and metaphysical fundamentals seems to flow into its symmetrical opposite: into
the extreme diffusion and generalization of the originary "deities"
neutralized by the principiomonoteista.20
With undoubted sensibility and acuteness, Gianni Vattimo
has been able, in some of his recent interventions, 21 to stigmatize
this phenomenon. Only today, he has noted most opportunely,
can we realize that
not only (as Max Weber has taught) is the economic and technical
rationalization of modern society the offspring of judaeo-christian
monotheism and the calvinist ethic, but also the awareness of the
historicity and relativity of the scientific paradigms, of the inconclusiveness and indefiniteness of science-or, to sum up, of a certain
"lightness" of being-is an extreme result of christian being .22

All this would have led to the deflagration of the autarchical model
on both sides of the question: that of reason and that of faith. On
the side of reason, with the awareness of the "historicity of the
scientific paradigms": that is to say, let us add, with the substitution of the old external metaphysical realism (characterized by a
univocal notion of "reality" and "correspondence") for that which
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Hilary Putnam calls "internal metaphysical realism" (for which the
aforementioned notions depend on a "cartographic convention,"
which relativizes them to the various languages of the scientific
disciplines). On the side of faith, with the awareness of the
"(mythological) character of many pages of the Bible": that is to
say, with the detaching of the authentic religious nucleus (inherent
in the salvational problematic) from the doctrinal apparatus of the
various secular theologies .
The way in which Vattimo focuses on the "spiritual situation
of the times" (to evoke a famous expression adopted by Karl
Jaspers 23 at the beginning of the 1930s) is, in our opinion, correct.
Apt, in fact, is the description of the effects of explodedmonotheism
as the copresence of old deposits which reemerge (and which
ratzingerian theology uses without embarrassment: starting with
that superstitious and apocalyptic rediscovery of the "meaning of
sin" and of the "belief in the devil," which a rigorous theology
of secularization should enumerate among the most typical
phenomena of "secularization" 24 ), and that "diffuse expectation
before religion" which had precisely nothing in common with
neopagan inclinations. The sole aspect of Va ttimo' s analysis which
we are not inclined to share is that implicit in the affirmation-by
now become all too widespread as a slogan in the intellectual and
pseudointellectual lexicon of these past few years-of the "lightness of being" which would result from the christian message.
Except that the dissent on this aspect touches on a philosophical-theological point which is not at all marginal, but, on the
contrary, profound and decisive. It is contained in the question:
Has christianity involved an exoneration or better a new, and in
a certain sense absolute, burden of responsibilityof human reason
before the event, and especially before that Event which we identify with the "world"? If it is true that, at the center of the christian
message, "there is a God who-neither
out of pretence nor for a
temporary disguise for pedagogic purposes, but seriously and out
of love-was
made man, that is, he lowered and reduced himself";
if it is true that it is precisely Christianity which subtracts from
being, "that of which greek metaphysics and then modern scientism have always spoken in terms of necessity, the rigidity and
the static condition which render every story, every contingency
and every thing which cannot be foreseen unthinkable": if all that
absolute----<:oefis true, should not there follow a great-indeed,
ficient of responsibility, and not an exoneration of responsibility,
before the being of the world? Does not Vattimo believe that it
was exactly the eternal spirals of cyclic time-only apparently
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leaden, with Milan Kundera's permission-to
"exonerate" man
and philosophy of every responsibility before the event, before
the most intricate sense of the happening?
Precisely this last aspect, when all is said and done, calls into
question the name of a thinker who, before Weber, had tried to
envisage the destiny of occidental reason, starting with the "coming into the world" of the divine: precisely the name of Hegel. It
is difficult, at this point, to overcome the impression that, if this
change is exempted from the hegelian conceptual dimension (with
everything which that involves in terms of a new burden of responsibility: philosophicaland ethicalat the same time), it then succeeds
in resolving the dilemmas man/history, reason/event, I/world,
which deeply scar thinking in our century. Thus, how difficult it
is to escape from the temptation to discern that which is Presupposed in the "zero-sum" readings of Hegel as an equal and contrary "reaction" to the philosophically deresponsibilizing, even if
ethicallyvigilant (and anything but unprepared), effects of "weak
thought."
Hence the legitimate suspicion that the present reinstatement
of the fsroblematic (of a late schellingian flavor) of the Presupposition, 5 although conceived in diametrical opposition to every
onto-theology, finishes up, when all is said and done, carrying
out, willingly or unwillingly, the same neutralizingfunction of the
old metaphysical theme of the Foundation, reinstating that same
relationof indifference to the "historicity" of the event of Presence
(Dasein) as being-in-the-world.And that the only way to pull out
of this vicious circle today is precisely by a radical philosophicalspeculative investigation of the "principle of responsibility."
In venturing the problem, we are prefectly aware of how
"prejudiced" is the Prinzip Verantwortungthematic by now, which
is equivalent-after
the fall of the Prinzip Hoffnung-to the miserly
wisdom of an antiutopian philosophy centered on the imperative
of "scarcity," and on the scrupulous observance of "objective constraints. " 26 But, in order to leave the shallows of such an outcome
(which only a gross misunderstanding could exchange for "disenchantment"), there is but one road : understand the principle of
responsibility in conformity with its most profound meaning,
which is contained in its etymology. That is to say: as the ability
to respond---apartfrom every abstract, formalistic and transcendental
notion of liberty and of decisionof the moderns, which today becomes sublimated in the euphoria of the bricolageor the imaginary
"which seduces" on the part of the priests of the postmodern-to
interrogration deriving from "necessity" and "destiny."
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4. FREEDOM AND DESTINY: AFTER HEGEL, BEYOND HEIDEGGER

The complaint concerning secularization has been transferred
in the last few years increasingly decisively from the level of
theological disputes to that of philosophical discussion. The terms
of the debate in course are rather various. It is not, however,
illegitimate to bring them back to two fundamental senses, which
may be respectively indicated as the "decadent" meaning and the
"emancipatory" meaning of the catchword secularization.
In the first sense, secularizationimplies a reading of occidental
history (and philosophy) in a "decadent" mode, as the progressive
fall of the strong metaphysical nuclei in the inexorable "loss of
the center. " 27 In the second sense, the term secularizationovershadows a process of positive liberation by new areas of life and
reality, of new and unforeseenemancipatory chances for human
thought and action.
Seen contextually, the two meanings seem, however, to give
rise to a double movement. More precisely: to a movement whose
dualness results from a different and opposite way of looking at
a single and identical phenomenon. Both senses, contextualized,
seem, that is, to lead to the same result on the descriptive plane:
the abandonment of the traditional "centered" structures, the collapse of the "unchanging things" (to use Severino's 28 words),
involve an irrevocable constitutional
crisis in theoretical
philosophy. At the end of this crisis are waiting, with different
emphases but-as is clear from the recent anthology Filosofia'86,
dedicated significantly to the "Secularization of philosophy" 29 -in
substantially convergent ways, the diagnostic schema of Vattimo
and the more markedly therapeutic one of Richard Rorty. For the
former, the constitutional crisis of traditional philosophy seems
to give rise to the proliferation of the historiographical activity as
"exorcism. " 3 For the latter, that same crisis leads to the thesis of
the marginal activity of philosophy and a pragmatic-hermeneutic
rehabilitation of the "doxastic" knowledge which is expressed in
the formula-incontrovertibly
anglo-saxon in flavor-of
the
31
"priority of democracy over philosophy."
Except that, exactly at the point in which the two sensesthat of "decadent" and that of "emancipatory"-of
secularization
seem to converge, they return in reality to be represented as paths
which fork. The fork, in fact, issues from the moment in which
one seeks to establish no longer negatively or only descriptively,
but positively-that is, hermeneutically-the
meaning of secularization. In truth it is Vattimo himself who points out the need for
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an unpretentious welding of the experience of the end of metaphysics and the possibility of delineating a positive "task" for
philosophy, able to overcome the limits of the "negativistic" and
"deconstructionist" approaches. But it is precisely in the way in
which the new positivity of thought is meant that opinions tendin the philosophical debate in progress and in the particular volume in question-"to
divorce" again.
In Filosofia'86 (and, sometimes, right at the very heart of the
individual contributions themselves) the positive function of
philosophy is in fact presented as being declined in inexorably
antonymical ways. On the one hand, it comes to be understood
in terms of a "procedural" conception founded on the communicative reciprocity of a flexible rationality, not apodictic, and permeable to metaphor; on the other hand, the "positivity" comes
instead to be formulated as the chance of a thinking capable of
posing radical interrogations by making a breach in the solid wall
of the secular theologies and the "worldviews" (or paradigms)
which crowd the religious and scientific-technological fruits of the
imagination of our epoch. In the most noted starting points of
the debate, in which this renewed radical vocation for philosophy
comes to take shape, the decadent and emancipatory meanings
of secularization assume the form of a providential false movement.32 For which the only authentic, authentically radical way,
to understand "freedom" of thought-opened
by the conceptual
schemas, edifying and salvational, of tradition- consists in its
paradoxicaloverturning in terms of "necessity"and "destiny." The task
which is thus opened in the presence of thought-or better: behind
it-is then a renunciation, without going back, of every "task,"
of every construction, of every edifying "cultural model." Only
from the renunciation of freedom (illusory) of Sinngebung, of the
"gift of sense" of philosophizing understood as an incessant compulsion to construct the "world," painting it with colored pieces
of chalk, does the chance open up to understand thought starting
from the dimension of destiny. This dimension can only be characteristic of that thinking which demonstrates itself able to encounter
"friction"-as
Wittgenstein said-with
reality: not of course of
that thinking which relates to the latter as an object-to-construct,
as a "smooth surface" free of ripples and obstacles. 33
It is in this way that the idea of destiny calls into question
that of necessity. The authentic "necessity of thought" is not the
necessity set in place by thought-the
relations that thought objectifiesas "world" -but the necessity that yieldsthinking:that originary
friction with reality that drives thinking unawares, the "influential
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scene" which every individual as such, "cast" into concrete life,
finds himself facing alone, with his naked strength and "power,"
once the "new modern figures of the guardian angel" ("transcendental I," "subject constituted out of every possible experience,"
etc.) have vanished. 34
Only by starting here will philosophy, in the era of science
and technics, be able to return to that enigma to which for millennia we have given the name of" experience": to that horizon which
"surrounds us from afar" and which represents the eternally inconclusive plot of our destiny. But does not all of that perhaps
require of thought a new positive attitude, able to emancipate it
from the passive (and parasitical) economy of the gloss and to
project it, with all the risks and the potentialities of the opportunity, towards a new dimension-after Hegel, beyond Heidegger?
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